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Abstract: Using a nationally representative sample of 1052 respondents from the United Kingdom,
we systematically tested the associations between the experimental trust game and a range of popular
self-reported measures for trust, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Rosenberg scale
for self-reported trust. We find that, in our UK representative sample, the experimental trust game
significantly and positively predicts generalised self-reported trust in the GSS. This association is
robust across a number of alternative empirical specifications, which account for multiple hypotheses
corrections and control for other social preferences as measured by the dictator game and the public
good game, as well as for a broad range of individual characteristics, such as gender, age, education,
and personal income. We discuss how these results generalise to nationally representative samples
from six other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Korea, Slovenia, and the US).
Keywords: GSS; Rosenberg; trust; trustworthiness; altruism; cooperation; reciprocity
1. Introduction
Experimental games such as the trust game (Berg et al. [1]) have been extensively
used by behavioral economists to elicit key social preferences, such as trust and trustwor-
thiness. Together with the dictator game (Forsythe et al. [2]) and the public good game
(Andreoni [3]), the trust game is one of the most widely used experimental games of
strategic interaction, by not only economists, but also by researchers in political science,
neuroscience, marketing, game theory, sociology, psychology, etc.
In the classic trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (BDM [1]), two participants
are randomly matched, and one acts as sender while the other one acts as receiver. Both
are initially endowed with £10, and the sender decides the amount to send to the receiver,
T ∈ [0, 10]. This amount is tripled and transferred to the receiver. Finally, the receiver
decides to send an amount Y back to the sender. T normally captures the experimental
trust of the sender, whilst Y captures the experimental trustworthiness of the receiver.
A number of studies, systematically reviewed and summarized by Galizzi and
Navarro-Martinez [4], have looked at the external validity of the trust game by trying
to predict field behaviors or self-reported trust or trustworthiness using experimental trust
games (Ashraf et al. [5]; Baran et al. [6]; Bellemare and Kröger, [7]; Bennett et al. [8]; Bouma
et al. [9]; Cardenas et al. [10]; Carter and Castillo [11]; Ermisch et al. [12]; Fehr et al. [13];
Glaeser et al. [14]; H. J. Holm and Danielson [15]; Karlan [16]; Riedl and Smeets [17]). We
review in greater detail these studies in the next section, but their main findings are as
follows: whilst some studies find that the experimental trust and trustworthiness measured
in the trust game can predict some field behaviours, the evidence is much more mixed and
contradictory for predicting survey questions on self-reported trust or trustworthiness.
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In this article we contribute to the existing literature by systematically testing the
associations between the trust game and a range of popular self-reported measures for
trust and trustworthiness, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) question on trust
and the Rosenberg scale for self-reported trust. We do so by using data collected by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Trustlab in the UK
(Murtin et al. [18]), a large nationally representative sample of the UK population (n = 1052).
In our estimates, we control for other social preferences as measured by other games, such
as the dictator game and the public good game, and we correct for multiple hypothesis
testing.
Our main finding is that trust, measured by the experimental trust game, significantly
and positively predicts generalised self-reported trust in the GSS question. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that such an association is documented. This is
also the first time that such an association is documented using a nationally representative
sample. We also add a variety of robustness checks in our estimates, including alternative
empirical specifications controlling for a broad range of individual characteristics, as well
as a replication of our results using nationally representative samples of six other OECD
countries (France, Italy, Germany, Korea, Slovenia, and the US).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the literature.
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5
briefly concludes.
2. Literature Review
Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez [4] conducted a systematic review of the literature
and meta-analysis of all the studies that have looked at the external validity of social
preferences games, such as the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, and
the public good game. Focusing on the trust game, they found a total of 13 studies that
have analysed the external validity of experimental trust and trustworthiness as measured
in incentive-compatible trust games. Their review shows that the experimental trust and
trustworthiness, in particular, have been used to predict a variety of variables outside of
the lab, including survey questions on self-reported trust, and a range of field behaviours
as diverse as: hours spent volunteering, per-capita household expenditure, frequency
of past trustful behaviour, default on loans, dropping out of loans, voluntary savings,
household investment in soil and water conservation, household contribution to soil and
water maintenance, outcome per worker, earnings, being active in an organization on a
regular basis, giving donations to a business school by respondents who previously studied
there for a MBA, participating in social organization and attending their meetings, holding
a socially responsible investment and its amount.
The studies reviewed by Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez [4] typically test the external
validity of the trust games by running regression models where the dependent variables
are the field behaviours (including the self-reported measures of trust) and the explanatory
variables are the experimental trust games, possibly with further control variables. Those
studies interpret the estimated coefficients of the regressions, if statistically significant, as
indicators of the fact that the experimental trust games are good predictors of the field
behaviours and are therefore ‘externally valid’. When assessing the external validity of the
experimental trust games, that literature does not typically focus on the overall goodness of
fit of the conducted regressions. In their meta-analysis, Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez [4]
indeed discuss the extent to which the considered studies report, and comment on, issues
broader than just the analysis of the estimated coefficients, such as the use of control
variables and the overall goodness of fit of the regressions. From the same systematic
review and meta-analysis by Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez [4], it also emerges that no
study to date has considered large representative samples of the population, and none
have used corrections for multiple hypothesis testing.
Looking at the findings of the systematic literature review and meta-analysis by Galizzi
and Navarro-Martinez [4], one can conclude that the evidence on the external validity of the
Games 2021, 12, 66 3 of 16
experimental trust and trustworthiness measured in the trust games is quite mixed. Whilst
some studies find trust and trustworthiness predict some important field behaviours, the
evidence is much more mixed and contradictory when predicting self-reported survey
questions on trust. In particular, four studies have shown that experimental trust is unable
to predict thirteen questions on self-reported trust (Ashraf et al. [5]; Fehr et al. [13]; Glaeser
et al. [14]; H. J. Holm and Danielson [15]). Experimental trustworthiness seems instead able
to predict some of the questions on self-reported trust and self-reported trustworthiness:
it predicts three out of ten self-reported trust questions and one out of three self-reported
trustworthiness questions (Ashraf et al. [5]; Fehr et al. [13]; Glaeser et al. [14]; Holm and
Danielson [15]).
So, to summarise, by looking at the evidence to date one can conclude that experimen-
tal trust does not predict self-reported trust, and that experimental trustworthiness fares
somehow better at predicting self-reported trust and self-reported trustworthiness.
Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez [4] also critically review and discuss some of the
possible arguments and reasons that have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Levitt
and List, 2007a,b [19,20]) to explain the lack of external validity of the experimental trust
games, and, in general, of the social preferences games: (i) the fact that participants in
the lab make decisions under the close scrutiny of an experimenter; (ii) the fact that
their decisions are unlikely to be anonymous; (iii) the specific lab setting of the decisions;
(iv) the low monetary stakes of the decisions; (v) the characteristics of the participants self-
selecting into lab experiments; (vi) the artificiality of the choice sets and of the time horizons;
(vii) the lack of repeated interactions over longer periods of time; and (viii) the lack of
context in the lab games. Another possible reason is that some of the studies reviewed
above (e.g., Fehr et al. [13]; Glaeser et al. [14]) use the strategy method to implement the
decisions made by players 2 in the trust games. All these reasons can be used to argue
that the trust games typically used in lab experiments can measure individual constructs
different, or more nuanced or complex, than just trust and trustworthiness, and therefore
might not be expected to be externally valid.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Survey Design
We use data collected by the OECD Trustlab survey on social preferences on a sample
of 1052 respondents in the United Kingdom (Murtin et al. [18]). Respondents were sam-
pled and surveyed online by a professional company in July 2018, and the sample was
nationally representative by age, gender, and income. Respondents were compensated
for participation, and all experimental tasks in the survey were incentive compatible. The
survey lasted approximately 35 min, and participants were recommended to complete it in
one sitting. The survey comprised of three main modules. In module one, respondents
were asked to partake in three incentive-compatible experimental tasks using real monetary
rewards, namely a trust game (Berg et al. [1]), a public good game (Andreoni [3]), and
a dictator game (Forsythe et al. [2]), to elicit their experimental trust (and trustworthi-
ness), cooperation, and altruism, respectively. Following this, respondents participated in
the Binswanger, Eckel, and Grossman (Binswanger [21,22]; Eckel and Grossman [23,24])
multiple-lotteries risk elicitation task, including an adapted variant with higher stakes. In
module two, respondents’ implicit attitudes towards public institutions were measured
using a single category Implicit Association Test (Karpinski and Steinman [25]). Finally,
in module three, participants answered a battery of survey questions, including various
measures of self-reported trust.
To test the generalization of our findings, we extend our analysis to a pool of
6025 additional respondents from nationally representative samples of six other OECD
countries collected as part of the OECD Trustlab project (France, Germany, Italy, Korea,
Slovenia, and the US). A list of all the survey questions and variables and their codebook is
available in Murtin et al. [18].
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3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Outcome Variables
We use five self-reported measures of trust as our primary outcome variables. These
include two generalised measures of trust: the first is based on the standard General
Social Survey (GSS) question asking respondents ‘Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people’
with answers measured on an 11-point Likert scale; the second question is an adapted
version of the Rosenberg [26] question, hereby referred to as the OECD Generalised Trust
question, asking participants ‘In general, how much do you trust most people?’, with
answers measured on an 11-point Likert scale as well. The third outcome variable is a
binary measure of trust using the hypothetical lost wallet question: ‘If you lost a wallet
or a purse that contained items of great value to you, and it was found by a stranger, do
you think it would be returned with its contents, or not?’. The last two outcome variables
are two composite measures of trust, one for institutional trust, the other for interpersonal
trust, as obtained by a factor analysis on a battery of self-reported questions measuring
trust in a variety of institutions and individuals, respectively. Table 1 below reports the
Pearson’s correlation coefficients among these five trust measures. Our five measures of
self-reported trust are positively and marginally significantly correlated with each other
(for summary statistics, see Table A1).
Table 1. Pairwise correlation between self-reported trust measures with Bonferroni correction.







(1) OECD Generalised Trust 1.000
(2) GSS 0.576 * 1.000
(3) Trust in wallet 0.241 * 0.357 * 1.000
(4) Interpersonal Trust 0.476 * 0.597 * 0.283 * 1.000
(5) Institutional Trust 0.452 * 0.499 * 0.234 * 0.513 * 1.000
* p < 0.1.
3.2.2. Explanatory Variables and Covariates
The two main explanatory variables to predict our self-reported measures of trust are
the experimental measures of trust and trustworthiness, as elicited by the Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe (BDM [1]) trust game. Recall that this game has two participants initially
endowed with £10. The sender decides how much to send to the receiver, T ∈ [0, 10]. This
amount is tripled and transferred to the receiver. The receiver decides to send an amount Y
back to the sender. The final payoffs are (10 − T + Y) for the sender and (10 + 3T − Y) for
the receiver. T measures our experimental trust (Camerer et al. [27]), while Y measures our
experimental trustworthiness. In the Trustlab games, each respondent played both roles,
acting as a sender and receiver subsequently. First, respondents decided on the amount they
wished to send to their unknown counterparts. Second, we elicited trustworthiness with the
strategy method: respondents indicated the amount Y they would return for every possible
amount T offered by the other player. Our experimental measure of trustworthiness is the
average amount sent back. In terms of payment, we randomly matched two players and
selected one of the roles for each player.
Furthermore, we use three covariates, namely altruism, cooperation, and reciprocity, to
control for other social preferences of our respondents. Altruism is measured by how much
the respondent offers to a matched participant in a dictator game with an initial endowment
of £10. Cooperation is measured as the contribution, from an initial endowment of £10,
made in a public goods game. Finally, our subjects played two public good games: a
standard one and a conditional one. The conditional public good game allows to measure
Reciprocity: respondents had to state how much they would contribute to a public game
conditional on the average contribution of other players. In this way we were able to control
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for whether subjects contributed more or less than the average contribution of others, a
notion akin to reciprocity. Table 2 below reports the Pearson’s correlation coefficients among
our various experimental measures of social preferences. Our experimental measure of
trust is positively and marginally significantly correlated with trustworthiness, and also
with other social preferences, in particular altruism and cooperation. Reciprocity is not
correlated with other experimental measures (for summary statistics, Table A2).
Table 2. Pairwise correlation between experimental trust measures with Bonferroni correction.
Variables Trust Trustworthiness Altruism Cooperation Reciprocity
(1) Trust 1.000
(2) Trustworthiness 0.398 * 1.000
(3) Altruism 0.270 * 0.304 * 1.000
(4) Cooperation 0.457 * 0.307 * 0.314 * 1.000
(5) Reciprocity −0.009 0.075 −0.068 0.067 1.000
* p < 0.1.
We also control for individual risk aversion as measured by their lottery choice in the
Binswanger, Eckel, and Grossman (BEG) task. The risk taken by a respondent corresponds
to the standard deviation of the expected payoff from their chosen lottery. Figure 1 below
shows the frequency of choosing the six lotteries in the BEG task. The wider grey bars
correspond to choices made in the first BEG task where the highest risk attainable is
9 pounds. The narrow grey bars correspond to a second BEG task where the riskiest
gamble has a standard deviation of 36 pounds (for details, see Table A3). The proportion of
respondents who are considerably risk-averse increases as the risk involved in the tasks
increase: for instance, more respondents chose gambles 5–6 in the second BEG task relative
to the first task. We also control for socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (for
summary statistics, see Table A4).
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3.3. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy tests the external validity of experimental trust and trustwor-
thiness by using them to predict a variety of self-reported trust measures. We outline our
model specifications to test the following main hypotheses in our UK nationally represen-
tative sample:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Experimental trust significantly predicts self-reported trust measures, and
this holds true when controlling for other social preferences.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Experimental trustworthiness significantly predicts self-reported trust mea-
sures, and this holds true when controlling for other social preferences.
To test these hypotheses, we use multiple linear regression models with and without a
set of control variables. In testing for H1, we estimate the model specification (3) below:
(Alternatively, we used an additional specification following Wilson [28] to create a trun-
cated measure of experimental trust. This involves a two-step process. We first regress our
experimental measure of trust on measures of altruism, cooperation, and reciprocity, and
predict the residuals. This residual trust measure is our truncated indicator of experimental
trust, and it is non-confounded with any other regarding preferences. Next, we use this
truncated measure of residual trust, independent of any other regarding preferences, to
predict our self-reported survey trust measures. We adjust for the standard errors to reflect
this two-step estimation procedure. Model specifications (1) and (2) reflect this estimation
strategy below:
Experimental Trusti = α1 + β1 Altruismi + β2 Cooperationi + β3 Reciprocityi + ε1i (1)
Self-Reported Trusti = α2 + β4 Residual Experimental Trusti + ε2i (2)
Model specification (2) is repeated for our five different outcome variables, namely the
GSS, OECD generalised trust, lost wallet, institutional, and interpersonal trust measures).
Self-Reported Trusti = α2 + β Experimental Trusti + δ11 Altruismi + δ12 Cooperationi + δ13 Reciprocityi + ε3i (3)
In testing H2, we estimate the model specification (4) below:
Self-Reported Trusti = α2 + β Experimental Trustworthinessi + δ11 Altruismi + δ12 Cooperationi + δ13 Reciprocityi + ε3i (4)
For robustness checks, we run simple linear regression without including any addi-
tional covariates as reported in (3) and (4). We also add further controls for risk-aversion
and socio-demographic characteristics of our respondents. In the results section, we report
p-values corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using the Holm (Holm [29]) correc-
tion procedure. We have also replicated all the analyses and results using the alternative
Romano-Wolf correction for multiple hypotheses testing (Clarke et al. [30]) with no sub-




Our sample of respondents is representative by age, gender, and income. Table A4
reports the demographic characteristics of the sample. In line with prior experimental
evidence, we find that our sample exhibits trusting behaviour, with a mean experimental
contribution of £5.89 (σ = 2.95) in the trust game (experimental trust). In the public goods
game, we find an unconditional (cooperation) and conditional (reciprocity) contribution of
£6.19 (σ = 2.99) and £0.69 (σ = 1.36), respectively. Finally, in the dictator game, respondents
send on average £4.29 (σ = 2.39) to their counterparts (altruism). The density plots of these
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contributions are shown in Figure 2: in the cases of trust and cooperation we observe a
bimodal distribution with peaks in the middle point (£5) and the top (£10); in the case of
altruism, we observe three typical responses: give nothing, give half the amount, and give
the whole amount.
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Respondents also exhibit high trust orthiness, ith an average of £8.9 (σ = 4.74)
returned by each respon e t. F rt er ore, i li e it ilson [28], e find that trust pays
off: senders often receive more than they have paid out and, on average, expectations of
receiving a certain payoff are matched (for details, se Figure A1). This is contrary to the
seminal work by BDM in which first-movers had sent 5.16 USD, while second movers had
paid back only 4.6 USD. This led to the proposit on: trust does not payback. A plethora
of si ilar fi i literature often raises the concern that trust is on th declin
(i.e., investment does not yield eturn at a given time). Nonetheless, like Wilson [28], our
fi dings further demonstrate trust begets trustworthiness.
Experimental trust varies significantly with age: trust measures are highest in the
group of 40–60-year-old individuals. Si ilarl , levels of cooperation increase with age.
Furthermore, trust levels are higher for males (p = 0.0 83) and lower for those who identify
as Catholics (p . . oth cooperation and altruism levels are also seen to be lower
for Catholics. Experimental trust and cooperation ar d creasing in the size of t e house-
hold (p = 0.02). There are no sig ificant diff re ces in levels of trustworthiness by these
demograp ic characteristics.
4.2. Are Self-Reported and Experimental Measures Correlated?
Table 3a presents Pearson correlation coefficients for our experimental and self-
reported measures of trust and other-regarding preferences, adjusted for Bonferroni cor-
rections. We find positive correlations between the GSS and the lost wallet self-reported
measure of trust and the experimental measures of trust. The former is also positively
correlated with experimental measure of trustworthiness.
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Table 3. (a) Correlation Analysis between self-reported and experimental social preference measures. (b) Regression
Analysis with Experimental Trust as predictor.
(a)
OECD Generalised






Experimental Trust 0.046 0.120 * 0.125 * 0.086 0.054
(0.134) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.135)
Experimental
Trustworthiness
0.037 0.106 * 0.077 0.072 0.066
(0.239) (0.001) (0.035) (0.031) (0.069)
Cooperation −0.068 0.057 0.103 0.032 −0.005
(0.028) (0.067) (0.005) (0.329) (0.884)
Reciprocity −0.127 * −0.090 −0.025 −0.042 −0.113
(0.000) (0.004) (0.500) (0.204) (0.002)
Altruism
0.112 * 0.120 * 0.074 0.116* 0.109
(0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) (0.002)
(b)
Outcome Measure
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 a Model 4 Model 5
OECD Generalised









0.057 0.082 ** 0.016 * 0.025 0.019
(0.028) (0.030) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014)
0.1469 0.025 0.0679 0.1179 0.1948
Altruism
0.133 ** 0.115 ** 0.009 0.055 ** 0.055 **
(0.032) (0.034) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
0.005 0.003 0.2388 0.004 0.006
Cooperation
−0.108 ** −0.026 0.007 −0.011 −0.027 *
(0.027) (0.028) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014)
0.005 0.7273 0.8511 0.4166 0.1878
Risk-Aversion
(BEG)
0.045 −0.023 −0.003 −0.001 −0.007
(0.028) (0.028) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015)
0.5045 1.00 1.00 0.9680 1.00
Constant
4.638 *** 1.458 * −0.262 −1.811 *** −0.870 *
(0.694) (0.716) (0.161) (0.335) (0.391)
Demographics b YES YES YES YES YES
N 1043 1040 750 904 769
Degrees of Freedom 1016.000 1013.000 723.000 877.000 742.000
R-squared 0.081 0.072 0.058 0.070 0.065
(a) note: * p < 0.1. (b) note: Legend: Holm’s * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Notes: superscript a. Linear Probability Model; superscript
b. Includes age, highest educational qualification, country of nativity, household income, household size, gender, religion, and region of
residence in the UK.
4.3. Does Experimental Trust Predict Self-Reported Generalised Trust?
Table 3b presents our findings using model specification (3) to test for H1. The
five columns in Table 3 correspond to different estimations for the five different survey
measures of trust, namely, the OECD generalised trust, the General Social Survey, the
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lost wallet, and the interpersonal and institutional trust. When the estimations account
for multiple hypotheses testing, we find that the experimental trust significantly and
positively predicts self-reported trust as measured by the GSS question. Our results are
robust across alternative specifications, such as a simple linear regression without any
additional covariates or by including further control variables, such as risk aversion and
using truncated experimental trust (see Table A5).
We further find that altruism, as measured by the contribution in the dictator game,
significantly and positively predicts self-reported trust measures, with the only exception
of the lost wallet question: for example, one standard deviation increase in experimental
altruism is associated with an increase of ~0.13 standard deviation points in our generalised
measures of trust. On the contrary, cooperation, as measured by the unconditional contribu-
tion in the public goods game, significantly and negatively predicts the OECD generalised
trust measure: one standard-deviation point increase in cooperation is associated with a
~0.15 standard deviation point decrease in this generalised trust measure. Risk-preferences,
as measured by the BEG game, do not significantly predict any self-reported trust measures.
Finally, we generalise our findings to an additional 6025 representative responses from
the OECD Trustlab surveys in six other OECD countries, namely, France, Germany, Italy,
Korea, Slovenia, and the United States. To this aim, we modify model specification (3) to
include country-fixed effects. Our findings are presented in Table A5d for three outcome
measures of survey trust, which were measured in all these countries. Controlling for
individual country fixed effects besides demographic characteristics and other regarding
preferences (The standard BEG risk game was played only in Germany, Italy, United
Kingdom, and the United States; while the high stake BEG game was only played in the
United Kingdom. We do not report these results because it limits our responses to a few
countries. Nonetheless, the results in Table 3 are robust when controlled for risk-aversion),
we find again that experimental trust significantly predicts generalised trust measured
by the GSS. Unlike in Table 1, we also find experimental trust to significantly predict the
OECD generalised trust and the lost wallet measure as well: while a standard-deviation
increase in experimental trust is associated with ~0.04 standard-deviation increase in the
GSS generalised trust, the same is associated with ~0.02 and ~0.01 standard-deviation
increase in OECD generalised trust and lost wallet measures, respectively. These results
are robust to multiple hypotheses correction as indicated in Table A5. In line with our prior
findings, the predictive power of altruism towards the OECD, GSS, and lost wallet trust
measures is robust to our country-fixed effects specification: a standard-deviation increase
in altruism is associated with a ~0.1 standard-deviation increase in survey trust measures,
ceteris paribus. A joint F-test comparing the larger model with country fixed effects to the
nested model without such effects returns a p-value less than 0.001 for each of all three
outcome measures of self-reported trust, indicating that the country fixed-effects model
has a better fit than its nested counterpart.
4.4. Does Experimental Trustworthiness Predict Self-Reported Generalised Trust?
Table 4 presents our findings using model specifications (1) and (2) to test for H2. In
this case, in the specification with control variables, we further control for reciprocity, as
measured by the conditional contribution in the public good game, which is often found to
be correlated with trustworthiness.
The main result is that experimental trustworthiness does not significantly predict the
self-reported trust measures. It should be noticed here that our experimental measure of
trustworthiness is derived by decisions made by players 2 in the trust games elicited with
the strategy method. Whilst the use of the strategy method is common in the literature
(Fehr et al. [13]; Glaeser et al. [14]), it may introduce some measurement errors in our exper-
imental measure of trustworthiness. Our finding that experimental trustworthiness does
not significantly predict self-reported trust measures can be explained by an attenuation
bias related to the fact that our only explanatory variable (experimental trustworthiness) is
indeed affected by such measurement errors.
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Table 4. Regression Analysis with Experimental Trustworthiness as predictor.
Outcome Measure
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 a Model 9 Model 10
OECD Generalised










0.017 0.039 * 0.004 0.010 0.012
(0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
0.2913 0.0237 0.2970 0.2165 0.1871
Altruism
0.125 ** 0.104 0.010 0.053 ** 0.048
(0.032) (0.035) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
0.0001 0.0031 0.2169 0.0007 0.0053
Cooperation
−0.084 ** −0.001 0.012 −0.002 −0.021
(0.025) (0.026) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013)
0.0007 0.9649 0.0583 0.8463 0.0995
Reciprocity
−0.603 ** −0.494 −0.020 −0.128 −0.282
(0.174) (0.195) (0.048) (0.091) (0.095)
0.0005 0.0114 0.6769 0.1592 0.0031
Risk-Aversion
(BEG)
0.043 0.019 −0.003 −0.001 −0.008
(0.028) (0.028) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015)
0.1256 0.5033 0.6130 0.9303 0.5643
Constant
5.223 *** 1.975 ** −0.209 −1.667 *** −0.638
(0.708) (0.723) (0.163) (0.346) (0.408)
Demographics b YES YES YES YES YES
N 1043 1040 750 904 769
Degrees of Freedom 1015.000 1012.000 722.000 876.000 741.000
R-squared 0.087 0.074 0.052 0.070 0.075
Legend: Holm’s * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Notes: superscript a. Linear Probability Model; superscript b. Includes age, highest
educational qualification, country of nativity, household income, household size, gender, religion, and region of residence in the UK.
In line with our findings in Table 3, altruism significantly predicts survey trust mea-
sures, with the exception, again, of the hypothetical lost wallet. We further find that
reciprocity, as measured by conditional contribution to the public goods game, significantly
and negatively predicts the OECD generalised measure of trust and also institutional trust.
Our results are also robust to a simple linear regression specification without any additional
covariates (see Table A5b).
Finally, we also generalise our analysis to evaluate the relationship between experi-
mental trustworthiness and the survey trust measures using the country fixed effects. We
find that a significant and positive correlation between the two measures is akin to our
findings in Table 2. This correlation between experimental trustworthiness and the GSS
trust measure is robust when controlling for experimental trust: conditional on controls, on
average, a standard-deviation increase in experimental trustworthiness is significantly and
positively correlated with a 0.05 standard-deviation increase in generalised trust.
5. Conclusions
We have systematically tested the associations between the experimental trust game
and a range of popular self-reported measures for trust and trustworthiness, such as the
General Social Survey (GSS) question on trust and the Rosenberg scale for self-reported
trust. Innovatively, we have done this using a large, nationally representative sample of
the UK population (n = 1052), controlling in our estimates for other social preferences
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as measured by other games such as the dictator game and the public good game, and
correcting for multiple hypothesis testing.
Our main finding is that trust, as measured by the experimental trust game, signif-
icantly and positively predicts generalised self-reported trust in the GSS question. We
have also conducted a variety of robustness checks in our estimates, including alterna-
tive empirical specifications controlling for a broad range of individual characteristics, as
well as a replication of our results using nationally representative samples of six other
OECD countries (France, Italy, Germany, Korea, Slovenia, and the US). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time that evidence is provided that trust, as measured in an
experimental trust game, significantly predicts self-reported trust. This is also the first
time that such an association has been documented using a large nationally representative
sample. This finding sheds a new, positive, light on the debate about the external validity
of social preferences games (Campos-Mercade et al. [31]; Charness and Fehr [32]; Galizzi
and Navarro-Martinez [4]; Levitt and List, 2007a,b [19,20]).
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Appendix A
Table A1. Summary statistics of self-reported measures of trust.
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Rosenberg (Adapted) 1043 6.562 2.227 0 10
GSS 1040 5.484 2.32 0 10
Trust in wallet 750 0.363 0.481 0 1
Interpersonal Trust 904 0 1 −3.396 2.504
Institutional Trust 974 0 1 −2.156 2.627
Table A2. Summary statistics of experimental measures.
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Trust 1052 5.889 2.947 0 10
Trustworthiness 1052 8.901 4.736 0 25
Altruism 1052 4.293 2.393 0 10
Cooperation 1052 6.195 2.996 0 10
Reciprocity 1052 0.699 0.384 −1 1.364
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Table A3. Summary Statistics of BEG task 1.












Averse Gamble 1 8 8 8 0 0.268 0.26
Moderately
Risk Averse
Gamble 2 7 10 8.5 1.5 0.215 0.2
Gamble 3 6 12 9 3 0.226 0.225
Gamble 4 5 14 9.5 4.5 0.107 0.094
Low Risk
Seeker/Neutral Gamble 5 4 16 10 6 0.085 0.105
High Risk
Seeker/Neutral Gamble 6 1 19 10 9 0.099 0.113
Table A4. Descriptive statistics of socio-demographic characteristics.
Variables Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 1052 41.194 13.358 18 77.5
Household Size 1052 2.569 1.244 1 7















Yorkshire and Humber 8.65
Education
Less than high school 2.85
GCSE, O level or equivalent 27.09
A level, International Baccalaureate, tech level or equivalent 20.44
Certificate of higher education, diploma of higher education or other post school qualification
other than university 15.30
Undergraduate university degree (e.g., BA, BS) 26.43






Mixed/multiple ethnic groups 2.38
Asian/Asian British 4.09
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Figure A1. (a) Trust versus Trustworthiness (b) Expected Trustworthiness. 
Table A5. (a) Regression analysis of Trust without economic and other regarding preferences. (b) Regression analysis of 
Trustworthiness without economic and other regarding preferences. (c) Regression Analysis with Residual Experimental 
Trust. (d) Regression Analysis controlling for country fixed effects. 
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Constant 
4.987 *** 1.957 ** −0.210 −1.583 *** −0.758 * 
(0.698) (0.714) (0.157) (0.332) (0.378) 
Demographics YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1043 1040 750 904 769 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
1019.000 1016.000 726.000 880.000 745.000 
R-Squared 0.051 0.059 0.054 0.055 0.048 
(b) 
Outcome Measure 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
OECD 
Generalised Trust 








0.018 0.053 ** 0.007 0.016 * 0.013 
0.015 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.009 
0.2208 0.0013 0.0518 0.0355 0.1415 
Constant 
5.109 *** 2.199 *** −0.132 −1.504 *** −0.739 * 
0.688 0.696 0.157 0.329 0.373 
0.0000 0.0016 0.4007 0.0000 0.0479 
Demographics YES YES YES YES YES 
Fig re 1. (a) rust versus Trustworthiness (b) Expected Trustworthiness.
Table A5. (a) Regression analysis of Trust without econo ic and other regarding preferences. (b) Regression analysis of
rust ort i ess it t ec i t r re r i refere ces. ( ) r ssi l sis it si l ri t l
rust. ( ) e ression nalysis control ing for country fixed ef ects.
( )
Outcome Measure
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OECD Generalised









0.038 0.097 *** 0.021 *** 0.031 ** 0.018
(0.025) (0.026) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
0.2777 0.0050 0.0080 0.0180 0.1708
Constant
4.987 *** 1.957 ** −0.210 −1.583 *** −0.758 *
(0.698) (0.714) (0.157) (0.332) (0.378)
Demographics YES YES YES YES YES
N 1043 1040 750 904 769
Degrees of Freedom 1019.000 1016.000 726.000 880.000 745.000
R-Squared 0.051 0.059 0.054 0.055 0.048
(b)
Outcome Measure
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OECD Generalised









0.018 0.053 ** 0.007 0.016 * 0.013
0.015 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.009
0.2208 0.0013 0.0518 0.0355 0.1415
Constant
5.109 *** 2.199 *** −0.132 −1.504 *** −0.739 *
0.688 0.696 0.157 0.329 0.373
0.0000 0.0016 0.4007 0.0000 0.0479
Demographics YES YES YES YES YES
N 1043 1040 750 904 769
Degrees of Freedom 1019.000 1016.000 726.000 880.000 745.000
R-Squared 0.050 0.056 0.043 0.053 0.049




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 a Model 4 Model 5
OECD Generalised










0.054 0.080 ** 0.015 * 0.023 0.018
(0.029) (0.030) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014)
0.2278 0.0350 0.1199 0.1778 0.2138
Risk-Aversion
(BEG)
0.002 −0.002 −0.008 0.011 −0.016
(0.038) (0.038) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020)
0.9530 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Risk-Aversion (adapted
BEG)
0.018 0.014 0.003 −0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
0.3397 0.7832 0.8691 0.4665 0.8132
Constant
4.977 *** 2.397 *** −0.092 *** −1.373 *** −0.662 ***
(0.686) (0.706) (0.157) (0.338) (0.378)
Demographics b YES YES YES YES YES
N 1043 1040 750 904 769
Degrees of Freedom 1017.000 1014.000 724.000 878.000 743.000
R-squared 0.059 0.056 0.046 0.051 0.048
(d)
Outcome Measure
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 a



















−0.537 *** −0.048 0.014
(0.119) (0.111) (0.027)
Slovenia
−0.254 * −0.643 *** 0.127 ***
(0.100) (0.121) (0.029)
Italy −0.712 *** −0.752 *** −0.159 ***
(0.102) (0.104) (0.025)
Germany −0.067 0.251 * 0.051
(0.101) (0.100) (0.026)
Korea
−0.309 * −0.203 ***
(0.132) (0.033)




Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 a





−0.557 *** −0.177 ***
(0.131) (0.027)
Constant
4.954 *** 3.654 *** 0.075
(0.273) (0.284) (0.061)
Demographics b YES YES YES
N 5591 6676 4569
Degrees of Freedom 5563.000 6645.000 4538.000
R-squared 0.074 0.088 0.099
Legend: Holm’s * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Notes: superscript a. Linear Probability Model; superscript b. Includes age, highest
educational qualification, country of nativity, household income, household size, gender, religion and region of residence in the UK.
References
1. Berg, J.; Dickhaut, J.; McCabe, K. Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games Econ. Behav. 1995, 10, 122–142. [CrossRef]
2. Forsythe, R.; Horowitz, J.L.; Savin, N.E.; Sefton, M. Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games Econ. Behav. 1994, 6,
347–369. [CrossRef]
3. Andreoni, J. Cooperation in public-goods experiments: Kindness or confusion? Am. Econ. Rev. 1995, 85, 891–904.
4. Galizzi, M.M.; Navarro-Martinez, D. On the external validity of social preference games: A systematic lab-field study. Manag. Sci.
2019, 65, 976–1002. [CrossRef]
5. Ashraf, N.; Karlan, D.; Yin, W. Tying odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines *. Q.
J. Econ. 2006, 121, 635–672. [CrossRef]
6. Baran, N.M.; Sapienza, P.; Zingales, L. Can We Infer Social Preferences from the Lab? Evidence from the Trust Game; National Bureau of
Economic Research: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2010. [CrossRef]
7. Bellemare, C.; Kröger, S. On representative social capital. Eur. Econ. Rev. 2007, 51, 183–202. [CrossRef]
8. Bennett, A.B.; Chi-Ham, C.; Barrows, G.; Sexton, S.; Zilberman, D. Agricultural biotechnology: Economics, environment, ethics,
and the future. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2013, 38, 249–279. [CrossRef]
9. Bouma, J.; Bulte, E.; van Soest, D. Trust and cooperation: Social capital and community resource management. J. Environ. Econ.
Manag. 2008, 56, 155–166. [CrossRef]
10. Cardenas, J.-C.; Janssen, M.; Bousquet, F. Dynamics of rules and resources: Three new field experiments on water, forests and
fisheries. In Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment; Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK, 2013. Available
online: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781847206459/9781847206459.00020.xml (accessed on 24 August 2021).
11. Carter, M.R.; Castillo, M. Trustworthiness and social capital in south africa: Analysis of actual living standards data and artifactual
field experiments. Econ. Dev. Cult. Chang. 2011, 59, 695–722. [CrossRef]
12. Ermisch, J.; Gambetta, D.; Laurie, H.; Siedler, T.; Uhrig, S.C.N. Measuring people’s trust. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. A (Stat. Soc.) 2009, 172,
749–769. [CrossRef]
13. Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U.; von Rosenbladt, B.; Schupp, J.; Wagner, G. A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness
by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys; Institute for Empirical Research in Economics-University of
Zurich: Zurich, Switzerland, 2003. Available online: https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zuriewwpx/141.htm (accessed on
24 August 2021).
14. Glaeser, E.L.; Laibson, D.I.; Scheinkman, J.A.; Soutter, C.L. Measuring trust *. Q. J. Econ. 2000, 115, 811–846. [CrossRef]
15. Holm, H.J.; Danielson, A. Tropic trust versus nordic trust: Experimental evidence from tanzania and sweden *. Econ. J. 2005, 115,
505–532. [CrossRef]
16. Karlan, D.S. Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict financial decisions. Am. Econ. Rev. 2005, 95,
1688–1699. [CrossRef]
17. Riedl, A.; Smeets, P. Why do investors hold socially responsible mutual funds? J. Financ. 2017, 72, 2505–2550. [CrossRef]
18. Murtin, F.; Fleischer, L.; Siegerink, V.; Aassve, A.; Algan, Y.; Boarini, R.; González, S.; Lonti, Z.; Grimalda, G.; Vallve, R.H.; et al.
Trust and Its Determinants: Evidence from the Trustlab Experiment; OECD Statistics Working Paper No. 2018/02; OECD Publishing:
Paris, France, 2018. [CrossRef]
Games 2021, 12, 66 16 of 16
19. Levitt, S.D.; List, J.A. Viewpoint: On the generalizability of lab behaviour to the field. Can. J. Econ./Rev. Can. D’économique 2007,
40, 347–370. [CrossRef]
20. Levitt, S.D.; List, J.A. What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? J. Econ. Perspect.
2007, 21, 153–174. [CrossRef]
21. Binswanger, H.P. Attitudes Toward risk: Theoretical implications of an experiment in rural India. Econ. J. 1981, 91, 867–890.
[CrossRef]
22. Binswanger, H.P. Empirical estimation and use of risk preferences: Discussion. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1982, 64, 391–393. [CrossRef]
23. Eckel, C.C.; Grossman, P.J. Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes toward financial risk. Evol. Hum. Behav. 2002,
23, 281–295. [CrossRef]
24. Eckel, C.C.; Grossman, P.J. Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study using actual and forecast gamble choices. J. Econ.
Behav. Organ. 2008, 68, 1–17. [CrossRef]
25. Karpinski, A.; Steinman, R.B. The single category implicit association test as a measure of implicit social cognition. J. Personal. Soc.
Psychol. 2006, 91, 16–32. [CrossRef]
26. Rosenberg, M.J. Cognitive structure and attitudinal affect. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 1956, 53, 367–372. [CrossRef]
27. Camerer, C.; Loewenstein, G.; Rabin, M. Advances in Behavioral Economics; Russell Sage Foundation; Princeton University Press:
Princeton, NJ, USA, 2004. Available online: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=57
10059 (accessed on 24 August 2021).
28. Wilson, R.K. Trust Experiments, Trust Games, and Surveys. The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust; Oxford University Press:
Oxford, UK, 2018. [CrossRef]
29. Holm, S. A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. Scand. J. Stat. 1979, 6, 65–70.
30. Clarke, D.; Romano, J.P.; Wolf, M. The romano–wolf multiple-hypothesis correction in Stata. Stata J. 2020, 20, 812–843. [CrossRef]
31. Campos-Mercade, P.; Meier, A.N.; Schneider, F.H.; Wengström, E. Prosociality predicts health behaviors during the COVID-19
pandemic. J. Public Econ. 2021, 195, 104367. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
32. Charness, G.; Fehr, E. From the lab to the real world. Science 2015, 350, 512–513. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
